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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE WAS PROCEDURAL ERROR IN THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN THIS 
CASE AND THE FACTS OF THOSE CASE UPON WHICH RESPONDENT 
RELIES ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE 
After the parties agreed on a set of stipulated facts 
including documentary evidence (R. 175-232)/ and submitted 
written arguments/ Judge Philip Fishier entered a minute order 
(R. 266) stating simply that judgment should be granted for 
plaintiff Dover Elevator. Shortly thereafter/ Judge Fishier 
resigned and was replaced on the bench by Judge Michael Murphy. 
The record contains no indication that Judge Murphy reconsidered 
the stipulated facts or written argument. Judge Murphy specif-
ically declined to enter conclusions of law based on the stipu-
lated facts. He did/ however/ enter a judgment (R. 402) for 
plaintiff. 
In its Opening Brief/ appellant Garden Towers Condo-
Owners Corporation argued that it was reversable error for Judge 
Murphy to enter judgment without reaching conclusions of law and 
without having reexamined the stipulated facts and legal argu-
ments of counsel. Appellant had a fundamental right to a full 
hearing and an informed decision. Judge Murphy's entry of 
judgment/ based solely on Judge Fishler's minute order/ without 
first becoming familiar with the facts and law, denied appellant 
that right. 
In response. Respondent has cited Matter of Estate of 
Cassity/ 656 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1982), and State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 
1001 (Utah 1975)/ as cases where this court approved the entry of 
1 
judgment by a successor judge after the "judge before whom [the] 
action [was] tried [was] unable to perform the duties to be 
performed by the court". Rule 63/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant has no disagreement with the holdings of 
those two cases but they are clearly distinguishable. In fact/ 
the procedure followed by the successor trial court judge in 
Matter of Estate of Cassity was essentially what appellant 
submits Judge Murphy should have/ but did not/ follow in the 
instant case. In Cassity/ trial was held before District Judge 
Snow. After hearing all of the evidence and arguments Judge Snow 
ordered his clerk to make a minute entry upholding the validity 
of a contested will. Judge Snow then died before signing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. His successor/ District 
Judge David B. Dee, entered Findings and Conclusions but only 
after reviewing the transcript of the prior trial along with all 
of the depositions/ pleadings and exhibits/ supplemented by oral 
arguments of counsel. 656 P.2d at 1024. On appeal/ the Supreme 
Court pointed out that/ 
"The conflict in this case comes not from the evidence 
but from the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence as to 
the existence of any undue influence. In view of these 
circumstances/ we find no abuse of discretion on the part of 
Judge Dee in failing to have the witnesses re-testify in 
front of him. . . . The trial here was complete to the point 
of all the evidence being in and the original judge having 
made a decision. The task confronting Judge Dee was 
confined to determining what conclusions were to be drawn 
from the testimony which had been given." 656 P.2d at 1025. 
(emphasis added) 
Likewise/ in the instant case when Judge Fishier 
resigned and the case was assigned to Judge Murphy/ Judge Murphy 
knew what Judge Fishler's decision was. He was not/ however/ 
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given any clue as to Judge Fishler's conclusions of law that led 
to the ultimate conclusion that judgment should be granted for 
plaintiff. In this case/ there is no evidence in the record that 
Judge Murphy reconsidered the Stipulated Facts or arguments of 
counsel and the inference is strong that he did not. Instead/ 
Judge Murphy entered judgment based solely on Judge Fishler's 
minute entry stating/ "The court having heretofore taken this 
matter under advisement/ comes now the court & orders that 
judgment be granted to plaintiff." All that Garden Towers asked 
was that Judge Murphy reexamine the stipulated facts and legal 
arguments and reach his own conclusions of law before entering 
judgment/ but he did not do so. 
The facts of State v. Kelsey/ supra/ 532 P.2d 1001/ are 
also clearly distinguishable. In that case Judge Wilkins/ who 
presided at trial/ resigned before written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were made and placed in the file. But before 
resigning/ Judge Wilkins stated into the record findings and a 
verdict which "were sufficient to meet the requirments of Rule 
52, U.R.C.P." 532 P.2d at 1006. That being the case, the 
Supreme Court held that "there can be no question about the 
authority or propriety of the successor judge to make and sign 
formal findings of fact and conclusions of law which were 
consistent with the findings and verdict of the judge who 
actually tried the case." Id. In the instant case/ Judge 
1. Based on Judge Murphy's refusal to sfgn Conclusions of Law 
submitted by counsel for Dover Elevator. 
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Fishier did not reach conclusions of law sufficient to meet the 
requirements of Rule 52. He resigned leaving only the minute 
order so frequently quoted in the briefs—a minute order that 
gave appellant and Judge Murphy no clue as to why judgment should 
be entered for plaintiff. 
In its brief/ counsel for Dover Elevator points out 
that he submitted Conclusions of Law to Judge Murphy for entry, 
but counsel for appellant objected to entry of those Conclusions 
of Law. Respondent correctly states that "These formal Con-
clusions were not entered because Defendant-Appellant argued to 
Judge Murphy that it was improper for him to do so." Respond-
ent's Brief/ page 11. Respondent concludes that a party may not 
complain on appeal of error that he caused or requested at the 
trial level. Id. It was not the entry of Conclusions of Law by 
Judge Murphy, per se, that appellant objected to. Rather/ it was 
entry of Conclusions of Law submitted by respondent when Judge 
Murphy had declined to in effect hold a new trial by reviewing 
the Stipulated Facts and legal arguments of counsel. To sign the 
Conclusions of Law submitted by counsel for respondent would have 
required Judge Murphy to adopt those Conclusions as his own and 
he was not familiar with the case. Judge Murphy recognized that 
to be the case. What he apparantly overlooked was that entry of 
a judgment without first entering conclusions of law denied 
appellant its right to know that the issues were dealty with 
fully and properly. 
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II. 
THE STIPULATED FACTS PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT 
HILL-MANGUM ENTERED INTO ANY CONTRACT IN ITS CAPACITY AS 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NOR THAT IT CONFORMED WITH REQUIRMENTS 
OF THE DECLARATION AND BY-LAWS WHEN IT CONTRACTED WITH 
DOVER ELEVATOR 
The entirety of Point II of Dover Elevator's argument 
is devoted to a point with which there is no disagreement: Until 
an association of unit owners is organized, the developer of a 
condominium building or complex may act as the Board of Directors 
of the not yet organized association of unit owners. 
In its Opening Brief, appellant set forth its argument 
that while Hill-Mangum had the right pursuant to the Utah 
Condominium Act and the Garden Towers Declaration of Condominium 
to act as the Board of Directors of the owners association which 
was not yet formed, neither the elevator maintenance agreement 
between Hill-Mangum and Dover Elevator nor the Stipulated Facts 
contain any indication that Hill-Mangum entered into the 
2 
agreement in any representative capacity. Stipulated Fact 6, 
upon which respondent relies in asserting that "Hill-Mangum, as 
the Board of Directors, contracted with Dover Elevator" 
(Respondent's Brief, page 15), does not justify that conclusion. 
To the contrary, Stipulated Fact 6 leads only to the conclusion 
that Hill-Mangum employee Gary Lawrence, as agent for 
Hill-Mangum, entered into a contract with Dover. 
2. "6. On March 1, 1982, a further agreement dealing with 
maintenance of the elevator to be installed was executed and also 
subscribed by Gary Lawrence on behalf of Hill-Mangum, Inc. . . ." 
(R. 176-177) ~ 
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In Respondent's Brief/ Dover Elevator conveniently side 
steps appellant's entire argument with respect to the issue of 
representative capacity by repeated reliance on the single 
proposition that the developer may act as the Board of Directors 
of the association of unit owners until the association is 
organized. The jump from that proposition to the conclusion that 
in the instant case Hill-Mangum was acting in its representative 
3 
capacity is without support in the record. 
Finally/ Dover Elevator has completely failed to 
respond to appellant's argument at part IV.B. of its Opening 
Brief/ beginning at page 23/ that even assuming an unexpressed 
intent on the part of Hill-Mangum to contract in the capacity of 
the then nonexistent owners' association's board of directors/ 
Hill-Mangum failed to act in conformity with requirements of the 
Condominium Declaration and Bylaws prerequisite to contracting on 
behalf of the owners' association. There is no evidence that 
unit owner approval of the Maintenance Agreement was obtained/ as 
required by paragraphs 11(a)(3) and 14 of the Declaration. There 
3. In Point II of its argument/ Dover Elevator also asserts as 
fact several things not supported by the Stipulated Facts and not 
otherwise supported by the record. Dover states that its 
"services were rendered to the common areas of the condominium 
complex" and "[t]he unit owners jointly used the elevators and 
jointly benefitted from the services rendered". Respondent's 
Brief/ p. 15. For all that appears from the record/ during the 
pendancy of the maintenance agreement the elevators were not used 
by anyone except Hill-Mangum or for any purpose not related to 
unit sales efforts. Nor is there any support in the record for 
Dover's assertion that the unit owners formed a corporation in "a 
thinly-veiled attempt to avoid . . . obligations to numerous 
vendors." Respondent's Brief/ p. 17. 
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is no evidence of a Board resolution authorizing Hill-Mangum1s 
project manager/ Mike Lawrence/ to enter a contract on behalf of 
the yet-to-be-formed owners1 association. In Respondent's Brief/ 
Dover Elevator has not argued otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on all of the above/ and on the arguments set 
forth in the Opening Brief of Appellant/ appellant Garden Towers 
Condo-Owners Corporation respectfully submits that the judgment 
entered by the trial court should be reversed and judgment 
entered in favor of appellant and against plaintiff Dover 
Elevator. 
Alternatively/ the judgment should be reversed and the 
case remanded to Judge Murphy with directions to hold/ in 
essence/ a new trial. Judge Murphy should be directed to 
consider the stipulated facts and the law and only then enter 
Conclusions of Law based on the stipulated facts. If the parties 
or the trial court believe further factual determinations are 
necessary/ an evidentiary hearing can be held to resolve factual 
issues not covered in the stipulated facts. 
Appellant should be awarded its costs on appeal. 
Dated this 2M^ day of September, 1987. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
By /fW^l 
Steven 
Bruce E. Coke 
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